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COMMENtARY
The politics of counting 
and the scene of rescue
Border deaths in the Mediterranean
Martina Tazzioli
Border deaths are not a new phenomenon. Since the early 2000s, the Mediterranean 
Sea has been named a ‘maritime cemetery’ by activists1 and critical migration scholars. 
However, over the last two years migrant deaths at the borders have gained more 
and more attention in the media and EU political debate after two deadly shipwrecks 
near the island of Lampedusa on 3 and 11 October 2013, causing the deaths of 636. 
Since then, the Mediterranean has become the focus for a practice of ‘counting the 
dead’ that has been at the core of databases set up by human rights groups, migration 
agencies and NGOs. The number of deaths is, however, difficult to ascertain: according 
to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), for instance, in 2014 3,072 
people died in the Mediterranean,2 while UNHCR counted 3,419 dead migrants in 
the same year; in 2011, according to UNHCR’s statistics, about 1,500 migrants died 
in the Mediterranean,3 but human rights associations estimate that the real number 
is around 3,000. The differences in statistics are very often the result of the choice 
whether to count missing persons; that is, those migrants who supposedly died but 
whose corpses have not been found. The Deaths at the Borders Database, for example, 
produced by an academic research team based at the University of Amsterdam, counts 
exclusively migrant deaths recorded by states in civil registries.4 It is precisely in this 
gap between the countable deaths and the uncountable ones that, I suggest, it becomes 
necessary to put into place an alternative politics, one that accounts for border deaths 
beyond the logic of mapping and counting.
our sea
October 2013 represents an important shift in the governmental approach to 
migrants at sea: the starting of Mare Nostrum, the military–humanitarian operation 
co ordinated by the Italian navy for rescuing migrants in distress at sea inaugurated 
what can be called the scene of rescue. From the border spectacle of the migrant 
invasion, media attention shifted to the humanitarian tasks performed by military 
actors in charge of saving migrant lives. At the time of writing, May 2015, the political 
context has changed again: in December 2014, Mare Nostrum had been replaced by 
the EU operation Triton coordinated by Frontex, whose declared purpose is border 
control and not rescuing migrants. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean is by now seen 
as a scene of rescue that is at the core of the EU reassessment of a migration strategy 
to respond to the ‘refugee crisis’ provoked by wars across the world from which 
millions of people escape. This crisis, which migration agencies and scholars define in 
terms of ‘mixed migration flows’,5 designates at the same time the crisis of states and 
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tection from the others. Such a crisis, which is actualized dramatically in the increase 
of border deaths in the Mediterranean region, is also the result of a European space 
that is closed off for the majority of the people who seek asylum and who can enter it 
only illegally.
If the logic of counting and mapping has been the main response in terms of 
knowledge production, NGO campaigns and policy-relevant research, European 
states have instead reacted to the too visible and unbearable effects of their migration 
policies – namely, the high number of border deaths in the Mediterranean – by putting 
into place humanitarian-military operations for rescuing migrants in distress at sea. 
The political debate that has arisen around the military-humanitarian operation Mare 
Nostrum had been focused on the rescue politics enacted by military actors – the 
navy, with the support of the coastguards – in charge of humanitarian tasks, namely 
of rescuing migrants at sea: how much extended the patrolling area should be, how to 
improve the rescue capacity of the navy, how to distinguish between the ‘persons in 
real need of protection’6 and the migrant smugglers or the possible terrorists, which 
actors have to save the migrants and at what costs. In the frame of rescue politics, 
people escaping wars become lives to rescue, shipwrecked persons. Thus, rescue politics 
designates the technical deployment of military vessels and monitoring tools for 
saving migrants at sea, and at the same time it indicates the implicit and unquestioned 
consideration of migrants as shipwrecked lives. To put it differently, people seeking 
asylum in Europe are people who in order to be safe have to put their lives at risk at 
sea and be rescued by military ferries. 
The exclusive focus on the modalities of rescue has overshadowed the peculiar 
politics of life that underpins military-humanitarian operations: migrants seeking 
asylum become lives to rescue and their freedom – of movement and of choosing 
a safe place to stay – is dislodged from the outset. The mechanisms of capture and 
containment of unauthorized movements act simultaneously through border restric-
tions that cause border deaths and through the humanitarian channelling system. 
The risks to life that people who seek asylum in Europe take, being forced to cross the 
Mediterranean ‘illegally’, and rescue politics are not opposite mechanisms of migration 
govern ment. This means that humanitarian measures hold a specific political tech-
nology over migrant lives by rescuing, sorting and channelling migrants,7 one in which 
people escaping wars can seek asylum only by first becoming shipwrecked persons to 
rescue. Humanitarian and security measures are thus two intertwined political tech-
nologies of migration governmentality.
Caught in-between these apparently opposite poles – the security approach and the 
humanitarian one – even migration activist groups and researchers took the stand of 
the humanitarian solution to border deaths. Ultimately, rescue politics has saturated 
the political space of action, becoming the blueprint for campaigns and practices that 
deliberately challenge ‘the human costs of border controls’. In 2014 a Maltese couple 
launched the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), a private rescue operation ‘to 
support vessels in need of assistance, coordinating its efforts with other search and 
rescue authorities around the Mediterranean’.8 Equipped with vessels and drones, the 
MOAS team started as an alternative to state rescue operations, with the idea that 
saving migrant lives at sea should be an issue that also involves civic responsibility. 
Then, in a second stage, it worked in collaboration with the Italian navy, assisting 
them during rescue operations and detecting migrants in distress at sea. A private 
rescue operation was also started by a German entrepreneur who has recently put 
into place Sea Watch,9 a rescue boat patrolling between Maltese and Tunisian waters. 
In April 2015, Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) and MOAS launched a joint Mediter-
ranean search, rescue and medical aid operation that received considerable attention 
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caused the death of more than 800 migrants.10 In autumn 2014, a transnational group 
of activists based in France, Germany, Italy and Tunisia set up Alarm Phone, an alarm 
number that migrants at sea can call in case of distress. Unlike MOAS, the Alarm 
Phone group is not equipped with vessels but acts according to a ‘watch the watchdogs’ 
strategy, calling national coastguards and ‘following up on the rescue operation on 
their response, making known to them that we are informed and “watching” them’.11 
The idea behind all these projects, given Europe’s irresponsibility in the face of 
migrant deaths, is to intervene in spaces that are usually reserved for state authorities, 
demanding that they operate in a prompt and adequate way to rescue migrants at sea 
and engaging in civic sea rescue to turn the humanitarian-military approach into an 
effective and urgent assistance to migrants in distress.
Freedom of movement?
A phone call is received by J., a rejected refugee from Ivory Coast in Tunis who was 
previously at the refugee camp of Choucha close to the Libyan border. Three Eritreans 
who left the camp in September 2013, went back to Libya and took a boat to Italy died, 
along with 323 other migrants, in the big shipwreck near Lampedusa on 3 October 
2013. Three months later, in March 2014, J. is informed by a refugee who is now settled 
in Germany that their friend from Ghana never arrived: although the Italian operation 
Mare Nostrum was in place at that time, a deadly shipwreck had probably occurred 
between Libya and Italy. For Italian authorities that shipwreck simply never happened. 
Reflecting upon border deaths, the first image that comes to mind for many of 
us is a list of numbers: the weekly death toll in the Mediterranean, released by the 
vessels operating under the Triton operation; the number of estimated border deaths 
since the late 1990s that differs according to the source and the approximate number 
of missing people after a rescue operation in the Mediterranean Sea. The govern-
ment of migration is grounded on a politics of numbers that sorts people into ‘risk’ 
categories, divides migrants into groups when they are disembarked at the harbour, 
and from time to time fixes the number of ‘authorized’ entries in a country. Counting 
border deaths is a mapping practice in which numbers proliferate while remaining 
approximate. 
Border policies are the cause not only of recorded deaths but also of the ‘disap-
pearance’ of migrants. In order to remain invisible and undetected, many migrants 
become untraceable even when they die during their journey. While for relatives and 
friends they are missing persons, for European authorities they are simply uncounted 
presences and unrecorded deaths.12 When dead bodies are found, the number of deaths 
often remains approximate due to the impossibility of verifying exactly how many 
people were on the vessel. 
On the southern shore of the Mediterranean, ‘border deaths’ are those persons 
– friends, sons, daughters, husbands, wives or travel mates – who, irrespective of 
whether their death has been certified by national authorities, are missing. The ‘ghost 
shipwrecks’ that have happened in the Mediterranean over the past decade have not 
stopped with the deployment of military-humanitarian operations; something escapes 
the death count that NGOs, activists, researchers and international organizations 
have started to pursue. Border deaths have become objects of recording, mapping and 
detection with an almost ‘real-time’ visibility that aims to produce an awareness of 
the situation in the Mediterranean, as with the Eurosur system, or through a posteriori 
data-gathering activities that aim to produce ‘archives’ of migrant deaths at sea. 
Indeed, most of the time the details of a deadly shipwreck can be retraced only by 
collecting information and testimonies from the survivals and reconstructing the 
event step by step, for instance by using radar and satellite images.13 The proliferating 
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increasingly constructed as a space that can be constantly monitored by technological 
eyes and by patrolling boats. Yet the disappearance of so many migrants challenges 
the image of the Mediterranean as a ‘transparent’ sea, bringing to the fore the patchy 
visibility that is at play and the presence of shadow zones. In this regard, border deaths 
are the unavoidable outcome – and not the unintended or the side effect – of the visa 
regime that instantiates asymmetries in the functioning and effects of borders. 
If border deaths are accounted for through a logic of counting, something remains 
undetectable from the political perspective of the northern shore of the Mediter-
ranean. Moving beyond the logic of counting means refusing to look at border deaths 
from the standpoint of this governmental gaze – migration agencies or states – and 
taking into account what border deaths are for the friends and the relatives of the 
missing migrants. This means engaging in a decolonial move that challenges the logic 
of recognition that sustains political campaigns and research projects aiming to count 
and identify dead migrants. By moving from the northern to the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean we realize that these uncounted deaths not only have a name but are 
fully known by their friends and relatives. Rather than producing a more exact border 
deaths population database, it is a question of 
bringing into visibility the reality of what the visa 
regime and the European mechanisms of border 
control generate: the ‘disappearance’ of women 
and men who die without being detected but who 
are counted as ‘missing’ in the countries of origin 
or of transit by those who know them. The logic 
of identification – giving a name to corpses found 
at sea – risks, paradoxically, reproducing the 
hierarchy that assumes dead migrants are people 
who, in order to exist, have to be recognized, 
counted and named from the northern shore of 
the Mediterranean. A politics that accounts for 
border deaths without reproducing this space of 
governmentality attends to what exists beyond 
counting and identification: unaccountable deaths 
represent the unquantifiable ‘cost’ of borders that 
cannot be assessed from the northern shore of 
the Mediterranean and that requires taking into 
account those people – friends and relatives – for 
whom they are missing persons.
The daily alternation between death tolls and the bulletins of rescued migrants that 
we have been witnessing since the start of the Mare Nostrum and Triton operations 
fashions us as spectators: migrants escaping wars become lives to save in the technical 
sense of being rescued at sea that ‘we’ can only observe and ‘count’. The friends of 
J. from the Choucha camp have become objects of a mapping gaze that crafts a new 
space of governmentality: bodies to count and name, to classify in order to assess the 
risk that migrants face in crossing the sea. 
The expression ‘human costs of border control’14 is used by NGOs, researchers 
and human rights activists to highlight the unwanted effects of borders in order 
to demand that states adopt a more humane approach in implementing migration 
policies. By challenging the costs-and-benefits perspective on border control, I am 
arguing that borders function in heterogeneous ways; far from acting only as barriers, 
killing migrants by giving them no other choice for moving than by risking death in 
the act of border crossing, they also filter and decelerate movements. Migrants who 
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targets of border restrictions. If ‘without borders there would be neither citizens nor 
migrants’,15 it is also true that borders act on subjects’ freedom in order to govern it by 
activating a complex regime of capture. In this way, freedom – the freedom to move 
and to find a safe space for living – is unthinkable in the narrative of rescue politics. 
Migrants at sea are not ‘saved’ in the sense of being free to move without once again 
risking death: on the contrary, once rescued they enter the juridical channels of 
asylum and only the luckiest among them will be granted humanitarian protection. 
Migrants crossing the Mediterranean are often depicted as subjects who choose to 
put their lives at risk, but such decisions are conditioned by the EU’s programme of 
borders-at-a-distance. 
Therefore, instead of demanding a stronger and more humanitarian European 
rescue system, reducing migrants to shipwrecked persons, we should move beyond the 
scene of rescue, looking at what happens to people seeking asylum before and after 
being rescued by military-humanitarian actors. In fact, the ongoing construction of 
pre-frontiers and of humanitarian spaces of containment that the EU is engaging in, 
negotiating bilateral agreements and the externalization of asylum with neighbour-
hood countries,16 highlights the attempts by EU states to not let people leave. Moving 
beyond the scene of rescue also means insisting on the freedom of movement and 
the freedom to choose a safe space to live, excluded in humanitarian logic by the 
asymmetry between the ‘beneficiaries’ of protection and those who are in charge of 
saving and rescuing them. 
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